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Parliamentary Engagement with the
Charter: Rethinking the Idea of
Legislative Rights Review
Janet L. Hiebert
I. INTRODUCTION
Canada has contributed an important idea to constitutional thought
about how to conceive of legislative responsibilities under a bill of
rights.1 This idea is the concept of legislative rights review, which
originated in the Canadian Bill of Rights,2 was adapted for the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 and has been emulated and altered in
several other Westminster-based parliamentary systems that have
recently adopted statutory bills of rights.4 These include New Zealand


Queen’s University.
The borrowing and adaptation of this idea elsewhere is discussed by the author in: “New
Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting
Rights?” (2004) 82:7 Tex. L. Rev. 1963; “Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of
Legislative Rights Review” (2005) 35 Brit. J. Poli. Sci. 235 [hereinafter “Hiebert, ‘Interpreting a Bill
of Rights’”]; “Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures” (2005) 68:4 Mod. L. Rev. 676;
“Constitutional Experimentation: Rethinking How a Bill of Rights Functions”, in Rosalind Dixon &
Tom Ginsberg, eds., Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2011), at 298-320.
2
S.C. 1960, c. 44.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
In Canada, s. 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2 requires the Minister of Justice in Canada (who also serves as Attorney General) to alert Parliament where bills are
inconsistent with the Charter. Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 No. 109 requires
that the Attorney General advise Parliament when bills are not consistent with its provisions. In the
United Kingdom, s. 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42 requires the sponsoring
minister of a bill to report either that it is compatible with Convention rights or that he or she is
unable to make a report of compatibility. This report must be made to both houses of Parliament
(Canada requires a report only to the House of Commons while New Zealand is a unicameral
system). What this means in the U.K. is that when a bill passes from one house to the other, a second
statement will be required, and it must take into account earlier amendments made. The respective
statements will be made by whichever minister has been given responsibility in the particular house.
In the Australian Capital Territory, s. 37(1) and (2) of the Human Rights Act 2004 oblige the
Attorney General to make a compatibility statement about every bill presented to the Assembly by a
minister. In Victoria, s. 28(2) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006 No. 43
requires that a member of Parliament who introduces a bill into a House of Parliament must “cause”
1
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(1990),5 the United Kingdom (1998),6 the Australian Capital Territory
(2004),7 and the Australian state of Victoria (2006).8 The idea behind
legislative rights review is that rights should be a core consideration
when assessing the merits of legislative objectives and how best to
achieve these in the process of developing legislation, as well as during
parliamentary scrutiny when deciding if amendments are warranted.
This paper argues that although the practice of legislative rights review in Canada has not materialized here as intended, Canada should
revisit the benefits of this concept, and it discusses reforms to revitalize
legislative rights review that are influenced by the United Kingdom’s
adaptation of this idea.

II. ORIGINS OF LEGISLATIVE RIGHTS REVIEW
The 1960 statutory Canadian Bill of Rights was criticized for its failure to establish a clear and coherent judicial mandate. Nevertheless, it
envisaged the laudable objective of trying to ensure that public and
political officials confront the implication of legislation in terms of
rights, as a condition for responsible political decision-making.
John Diefenbaker, whose government introduced the Canadian Bill
of Rights, differed from conventional views about the role and function
of a bill of rights. Rather than relying exclusively on judicial review, he
thought it possible and desirable to improve Parliament’s capacity to
function as a custodian of civil liberties.9 To that end, the Bill of Rights
created a new statutory reporting requirement in section 3 that the
Minster of Justice alert Parliament if introducing legislation that was
inconsistent with rights.10 The very requirement of having to make this
a statement of compatibility to be prepared and presented before the House of Parliament into which
the bill is introduced before his or her second reading speech on the bill.
5
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 No. 109.
6
Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42.
7
Human Rights Act, 2004 (Australian Capital Territory).
8
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006 No. 43 (Victoria).
9
Christopher MacLennan, Toward the Charter (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2003), at 148.
10
Section 3 of the Canadian Bill of Rights requires:
... the Minister of Justice shall, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed
by the Governor in Council, examine every regulation transmitted to the Clerk of the
Privy Council for registration pursuant to the Statutory Instruments Act and every Bill
introduced in or presented to the House of Commons by a Minister of the Crown, in order
to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and
provisions of this Part and he shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons at the first convenient opportunity.

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) PARLIAMENTARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CHARTER

89

kind of report was expected to trigger a new emphasis on rights when
evaluating proposed legislation, and to create a new rights consciousness
within the bureaucracy, government and Parliament.
Rights protection under the Canadian Bill of Rights was expected to
occur not simply, or even primarily, because of the introduction of rightsbased judicial review. Quite separate from any role that judicial review
served, rights were expected to be protected through a combination of a
new practice for bureaucratic assessments of whether proposed legislation implicated rights adversely, and also because of the political implications that accrued from a new statutory obligation that the Minister of
Justice alert Parliament when bills violated rights. This statutory obligation was expected to discourage cabinet from approving bills that would
require this report of inconsistency. Former Deputy Minister of Justice
Elmer Driedger speculated that if cabinet insisted on approving a bill that
violated rights, the Minister of Justice would likely feel compelled to
resign rather than risk being put in the position of having to make a
report to Parliament that the government knowingly was introducing
legislation inconsistent with rights.11
Driedger’s confidence that the reporting requirement would precipitate careful evaluation of whether and how policy initiatives implicate
rights was also influenced by the presence in the Bill of Rights of the
notwithstanding clause in section 2 (a precursor to section 33 of the
Charter). This provision requires that if a government is determined to
introduce legislation that patently violates protected rights, it must
declare that the legislation will operate notwithstanding the Canadian
Bill of Rights. Without this declaration, courts are otherwise obliged to
interpret the legislation in a manner that does not abrogate, abridge or
infringe the rights or freedoms in the Bill of Rights. From Driedger’s
perspective, the inevitable criticism that would accompany use of this
declaration (both in and beyond Parliament) would discourage any such
use. As he stated, no government “would be so foolish or stupid as to
submit to Parliament a bill obviously in conflict with the Bill of Rights”.
This is because opposition parties would have ample grounds to move an
amendment which, “as a matter of simple politics, the government would
have to accept”.12 Consequently, from his perspective, any bill that would
require reliance on the section 2 notwithstanding clause had almost no
11
Elmer A. Driedger, “The Meaning and Effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights: A
Draftsman’s Viewpoint” (1977) 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 311 [hereinafter “Driedger”].
12
Id.
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chance of becoming law.13 Thus, Driedger believed that the combined
effects of a political interest in not having to report to Parliament that a
bill was inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, and a political reluctance to
rely on the Bill of Rights’ notwithstanding provision, provided ample
insurance that the government would proactively comply with the Bill of
Rights.
This proactive capacity to protect rights was believed possible under
a Westminster-based political system in a way precluded by the separated
system in the United States. The reason for this belief was that under a
parliamentary system the “whole machinery of government” could be
enlisted in the project of safeguarding rights, a holistic approach considered possible only where there is a fusion of executive and legislative
powers. As Driedger opined on the juxtaposition of this particular kind of
a bill of rights and a Westminster parliamentary system, the idea of
enlisting all branches of government in the protection of rights represented the world’s most “comprehensive, powerful and effective” bill of
rights:
All future laws are ... purified before they become laws ... This process
is possible only under a parliamentary system of government, where
officials are responsible to Ministers, Ministers to the House of
Commons, and the House of Commons to the electorate. The whole
machinery of government — apart from the courts — is enlisted by the
Bill of Rights to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms are
safeguarded. It cannot be disputed that at this stage the Bill of Rights
is powerfully effective. This kind of control is not possible with a
congressional system of government, where there is complete
separation between the executive and the legislature and where the
executive cannot control the content of bills submitted to the
legislature.14

However, this confidence in legislative rights review under the Canadian
Bill of Rights was seriously misplaced for three reasons. First, it did not
anticipate that a direct relationship would arise between the degree to
which courts interpret rights robustly or grant significant remedies for
rights violations on the one hand, and the strength of the bureaucratic and
political incentives to evaluate proposed legislation rigorously from a
rights perspective, on the other. As it turned out, the Supreme Court’s
decision not to interpret the Bill of Rights as imposing new norms for
13
14

Id.
Id., at 316.
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constraining uses of state power, but as recognition of the rights that
already existed (R. v. Robertson15), along with the validation of almost all
federal legislation challenged, provided little incentive for policy and
political officials to question rigorously the merits of legislative initiatives from a rights perspective.16 Second, this optimistic view also did
not take into consideration that the absence of reports of inconsistency
would provide Parliament little context or experience for questioning a
government’s assumptions that legislation complies with rights. Third,
the idea that legislation could be purified through the adoption of good
administrative and political practices17 belied a lack of appreciation that
fundamental disagreements are more likely to arise over questions about
the scope of rights, the justification of the legislative goal, and the merits
of judgments about proportionality, than about actual political intentions
to respect or safeguard rights.
The statutory reporting requirement has been adapted for the Charter
in section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act.18 However, this obligation has not facilitated the kind of intra-institutional scrutiny that the
original concept intended. Bills are evaluated by government lawyers
for the executive. However, Parliament has remained relatively insignificant as a venue for debate about Charter considerations and rarely
questions the implicit claims of government that bills are consistent with
the Charter (implicit because of the absence of a report of Charter
inconsistency).

15

[1963] S.C.J. No. 62, [1963] S.C.R. 651 (S.C.C.).
This interpretation is based on interviews [hereinafter “Interviews”] with several officials
in the Human Rights Centre at the Department of Justice, which were conducted between 1999 and
2000 on the basis of anonymity. I also had repeated and candid conversations with John Tait (19941995) and George Thomson (1998-1999), both of whom had earlier served as deputy minister in the
Department.
17
Driedger, supra, note 11, at 306.
18
This requirement is found in section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. J-2, which provides:
Subject to subsection (2), the Minister shall, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Governor in Council, examine every regulation transmitted to
the Clerk of the Privy Council for registration pursuant to the Statutory Instruments Act
and every Bill introduced in or presented to the House of Commons by a minister of the
Crown, in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with
the purposes and provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Minister shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons at the first convenient opportunity.
16
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III. CHARTER EVALUATIONS PRIOR TO LEGISLATION
BEING INTRODUCED TO PARLIAMENT
Despite the statutory obligation of the Minister of Justice to alert Parliament if bills are inconsistent with the Charter, no report of Charter
inconsistency has ever been made, and it is highly unlikely that reports of
inconsistency will be made in the future. The Canadian practice of nonreporting is influenced by the political and legal consequences that would
accrue from acknowledging that a bill is inconsistent with the Charter.
The popularity of the Charter makes it difficult for governments to
concede that they are introducing a bill that is not consistent with the
Charter. The constitutional authority of courts to declare inconsistent
legislation invalid also discourages such a report because acknowledging
incompatibility would make it extremely difficult for any subsequent
successful defence of the legislation if it were later subject to Charter
litigation. Unless the Supreme Court takes the concept of judicial
deference to an entirely new level, it is unlikely to uphold legislation as a
reasonable limit under section 1 if the Minister of Justice had earlier
conceded that the legislation was not reasonable.
However, the lack of reports on Charter inconsistency does not mean
that bills are introduced to Parliament without any consideration for their
implications for the Charter. On the contrary, bills are systematically
assessed by legal officials in the Department of Justice who provide
ministers with advice about the likelihood that these initiatives could
result in successful Charter litigation.19
The nominal purpose of Charter vetting is for the minister to fulfil
his or her reporting obligation under section 4.1 of the Department of
Justice Act. The more political purpose of these evaluations is to manage
the risk associated with passing legislation in a constitutional system
where courts have strong interpretive and remedial powers.

IV. RISK AVERSION
In the early days of the Charter, it was not obvious how the Supreme
Court would interpret the Charter, and thus it was unclear what the
consequences would be if legislation was not subject to robust pre19
James B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter. Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers’ Intent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), at 222-57 [hereinafter “Kelly, Governing with the
Charter”]; Janet L. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament’s Role? (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2002), at 3-19 [hereinafter “Hiebert, Charter Conflicts”].
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legislative Charter scrutiny. This uncertainty had a substantial influence
on how bills were initially evaluated. The sustained period of judicial
restraint under the Canadian Bill of Rights had conditioned the public
service to adopt similarly constrained interpretations of rights when
advising on potential conflicts in the early days of the Charter. However,
more robust Charter vetting began to occur after several early Supreme
Court decisions revealed the very real possibility that governments could
incur serious political, policy and fiscal costs should they lose a Charter
case.20 These influential decisions were Singh v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) (which set aside Canada’s refugee
determination process, necessitating very costly changes);21 Schachter v.
Canada (in which the Court indicated that it was prepared to “read in”
new meaning to legislation as a remedy for a rights violation);22 and R. v.
Oakes (establishing what appear to be difficult criteria for justifying
legislative restrictions on rights).23
Growing concerns about how legislation would fare before the Supreme Court encouraged attempts to reduce the risk of invalidation. In
1991 then clerk of the Privy Council Paul Tellier wrote to deputy
ministers to urge that Charter scrutiny be conducted in the early stages of
the policy process.24 In what became known as the “Tellier Memorandum”, departments were called upon to incorporate Charter analysis in
the memorandum to cabinet, and the analysis was to “include an assessment of the risk of successful challenge in the courts, the impact of an
adverse decision, and possible litigation costs”.25
Two other factors that have led to more robust forms of scrutiny are
the popularity of the Charter, particularly as contrasted with the relatively
ineffective and uncelebrated status of the statutory Bill of Rights, and an
emerging public confidence in the judiciary as the primary interpreter of
rights, which makes it politically risky for politicians to defend positions
that seem contrary to judicial views on Charter compatibility, or to
invoke the notwithstanding clause in the event the Supreme Court sets
aside inconsistent legislation. Most uses of the notwithstanding clause
occurred in the early years of the Charter, often in a pre-emptive attempt
20

Interviews, supra, note 16.
[1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.).
[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.).
23
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
24
Kelly, Governing with the Charter, supra, note 19, at 234.
25
Mary Dawson, “The Impact of the Charter on the Public Policy Process and the Department of Justice” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 597.
21
22
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to protect policy distinctions amidst uncertainty about how the Court
would interpret the equality protection in section 15.26 However, the
notwithstanding clause soon became viewed as an unacceptable way to
insulate legislation from the effects of a negative judicial decision,27 even
for controversial decisions that fundamentally challenged the validity of
government policy. A good example of this occurred after the Supreme
Court ruled in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)28 that
the way the government attempted to regulate tobacco advertising was
not consistent with the Charter. Then Cabinet Minister David Dingwall
recommended that the government respond to this ruling by invoking the
notwithstanding clause, but this recommendation was rejected by
cabinet, which instead approved revised legislation that was premised on
less restrictive ways to accomplish the legislative goal that the government believed could be defended as a reasonable limit under section 1.29
Concerns about the costs of defending legislation and the practical
and political interests in protecting legislative priorities from being
derailed by judicial review have resulted in institutional procedures
intended to insulate legislation from the effects of a negative judicial
ruling. Regardless of which political party is in power, no government
welcomes unforeseen obstacles to the pursuit of its legislative agenda. A
26

This interpretation is drawn from a review of all uses of this power, as compiled by Tsvi
Kahana, “The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public discussion: Lessons from the Ignored
Practice of Section 33 of the Charter” (2001) 44:3 Canadian Public Administration 61.
27
Extreme controversy followed upon Quebec’s decision to use the notwithstanding clause
in response to the ruling in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) that set aside Quebec’s signs law for violating freedom of expression. What
intensified this controversy was the context in which the notwithstanding clause was used. At the
time, the Meech Lake Accord was subject to ratification by federal and provincial legislatures. A
particularly controversial element of this Accord was the relationship between its proposed distinct
society clause and the Charter. Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa invoked the notwithstanding clause
to insulate new legislation from judicial review. The legislation differed significantly from the earlier
law of the Parti Québécois that had been subject to the Charter challenge. Nevertheless, Premier
Bourassa decided to invoke the notwithstanding clause to avoid uncertainty as to whether new
legislation would survive the Charter. Adding to the controversy was a statement Bourassa made that
suggested that use of the notwithstanding clause might not have been necessary had the Meech Lake
Accord and distinct society clause been in place. This statement was interpreted by critics of the
distinct society clause as confirming their fears that the clause would undermine protection for
Charter rights, and also served to undermine the legitimacy of the notwithstanding clause. The
political fallout was significant. Then Manitoba premier Gary Filmon abruptly withdrew his
minority government’s support for the Meech Lake Accord, which required unanimous agreement to
succeed. See Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1996), at 138-44.
28
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.).
29
Interviews, supra, note 16.

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) PARLIAMENTARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CHARTER

95

government that has successfully passed legislation will often be reluctant to reopen the relevant issues, expend additional resources necessary
to defend the measure politically, or manage internal divisions that could
undermine caucus support, as may be required should legislation be
struck down in whole or in part, or its meaning or effects altered significantly through judicial interpretation. I refer to this concern as riskaversion. The attempt to anticipate judicial objections and incorporate
judicial norms into legislative decision-making is not unique to Canada.
The United Kingdom similarly engages in risk assessments of proposed
legislation in terms of compatibility with the European Convention on
Human Rights,30 and institutional actors in France, Germany and Spain
also engage in pre-legislative review for similar risk-averse motives.31
As discussed above, the principal institutional mechanism for managing risk in Canada has been a change to the Memorandum to cabinet to
require an assessment of the risk of a successful Charter challenge in the
courts, the anticipated impact of negative decisions, and possible
litigation costs.32 When assessing proposed legislation, Charter consistency is interpreted by government lawyers on the basis of conformity
with relevant case law, and assessments are framed in the language of
risk: the likelihood that courts will declare that legislation inconsistent
with protected rights, in the event of litigation. The political criterion for
whether a report on inconsistency with the Charter is required is whether
a credible Charter argument can be made in defence of the legislation.33
Not surprisingly, the manner in which the Court has interpreted the
Charter and, in particular, its approach to section 1, have significantly
influenced pre-legislative Charter evaluations by government officials.
The Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a two-stage approach to the
Charter that distinguishes the question of whether a right has been
infringed from the assessment of the validity of the legislation, has led to
a broader interpretation of rights than would have occurred had the Court
adopted definitional limits, thus increasing the likelihood of and frequency with which legislation was vulnerable for constituting a prima
30
Janet L. Hiebert, “Governing under the Human Rights Act: The Limitations of Wishful
Thinking” (January 2012) Public Law, at 34-36. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223.
31
Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford:
Oxford University, 2000).
32
Government of Canada Privy Council Office, Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations, 2d edition, ch. 2.2, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/legislation/
pdf-eng.pdf>.
33
Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra, note 19, at 7-13.
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facie rights infringement. As a result, Canadian governments have to
defend legislation more often than in jurisdictions where rights are
interpreted more narrowly.
A second reason that this judicial approach has influenced bureaucratic assessments of compatibility is that the regularity of section 1
justifications has established a readily understood context for anticipating
the kinds of questions and criteria asked by the Court when legislation is
litigated. The invocation of consistently cited criteria for evaluating
impugned legislation allows policy officials and legal advisors to predict,
with a fair degree of confidence, not only when legislation will be found
to implicate the Charter, but also what kinds of questions the courts will
ask when deciding if legislation constitutes a justifiable restriction on a
protected right. Thus, pre-legislative review focuses heavily on whether
legislative initiatives are likely to satisfy judicial interpretations of
proportionality, and has involved government lawyers in a regular role of
advising relevant departments to seek alternative means to accomplish a
legislative goal.34 As James Kelly argues, the Charter has helped transform the Department of Justice’s role from providing merely “a technical
review of legislation to a substantive role in the development of new
policy”,35 so much so that the Department of Justice has assumed the
importance of a central agency within the machinery of government.36
Many provincial governments, particularly in the larger provinces, have
adopted procedures that similarly give emphasis to the identification
of possible Charter problems, with the purpose of reducing the risk of
constitutional invalidation.37
A third reason the Court’s approach to section 1 has influenced bureaucratic and political Charter assessments is the significant breadth for
justifying legislative objectives that nevertheless were found to violate
Charter-protected rights. The Court’s reluctance to veto legislation in the
first part of the section 1 inquiry has signalled to politicians the political
opportunity to try to advance a wide range of policy objectives. In rare
cases, anticipation of Charter vulnerability has resulted in developing
34

Interviews, supra, note 16.
James B. Kelly, “Legislative Activism and Parliamentary Bills of Rights” [hereinafter
“Kelly, ‘Legislative Activism’”] in James B. Kelly & Christopher P. Manfredi, Contested
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2009), at 93.
36
Id., at 89.
37
Kelly, Governing with the Charter, supra, note 19, at 214; Andrew Petter, “Legalize
This: The Chartering of Canadian Politics” in Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The
Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 211.
35
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litigation strategies when legislation is actually being developed or assessed
by Parliament, including uses of legislative preambles and committee
hearing processes to explain Parliament’s “Charter judgment”.38

V. RISK TAKING
Despite serious apprehension of the costs associated with successful
Charter litigation, risk aversion is not the only strategy a government
invokes under the Charter. Depending on the legislative objective or the
political context in which it arises, risk aversion may give way to risk
taking, where government knowingly introduces a bill that has a high
degree of risk for litigation and invalidation.
Legal advice on Charter consistency is not binding, and therefore
does not automatically lead to amendments to bills to address perceived
concerns of Charter inconsistency. Instead, this advice leads to political
judgment about whether and how to interpret it in the context of the
government’s legislative agenda, specifically, whether amendments are
required to allow the minister to claim the bill is compatible for purposes
of the cabinet memorandum, or whether the Minister of Justice is
prepared to exercise his or her own professional judgment as a lawyer
and disagree with the advice provided by legal advisors in the Department of Justice.
These political judgments reflect broad discretion for the following
reasons:





the difficulty of predicting the implications of earlier Charter cases
for new issues;
political and ideological perspectives that invite differences on how
the Charter implicates the role of the state, or what responsibility
government has to pursue perceived social problems or address substantive inequality in power or resources, thus affecting assessments
of Charter compatibility;
strategic calculations about whether to reduce Charter problems or
gamble on whether failure or minimal responses to address these

38
Good examples of this occurred in the following legislative disagreements with judicial
rulings about the rules of evidence in sexual assault trials: Bill C-49, following R. v. Seaboyer,
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”]; Bill C-72, following R.
v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Daviault”]; and Bill
C-46, following R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“O’Connor”]. Hiebert, Charter Conflicts, supra, note 19, at 91-117.
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will result in litigation, which involve consideration of the resources
required to mobilize policy communities and political allies to
revisit a legislative goal should it be declared unconstitutional,
whether the immediate political gains of passing legislation exceed
the anticipated costs if it is later declared unconstitutional, the time
a government may have before a bill is declared invalid, and the
political benefits of being able to blame the Court for preventing
government from pursuing a particular objective it claims to be in
the public interest.
Under current conditions, it is virtually impossible to know the nature of the legal advice rendered or how and why government has
responded to this advice in the manner it has. The confidential nature of
the advice provided to ministers is strictly protected (despite the fact that
legal advice is published in New Zealand)39 and this, along with cabinet
solidarity, makes it virtually impossible to know whether, why or how
often the government ignores or challenges the advice it receives.
Compounding this uncertainty is the political environment in which
legal advisors work, which has resulted in an extreme reluctance of
government officials, particularly under the Harper government, to give
interviews on how Charter evaluations are assessed, even under strong
assurances of anonymity.40
Concern that judgment on Charter compatibility is influenced by
political and partisan considerations has led James Kelly and Matthew
Hennigar to argue that the functions of the Attorney General and the
Minister of Justice should be separated for Charter reporting purposes,
with responsibility for assessing Charter compatibility given to the
Attorney General.41 While others have called for greater independence of

39
Department of Justice, New Zealand, “Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act”,
online: <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-and-human-rights/human-rights/domestichuman-rights-protection/about-the-new-zealand-bill-of-rights-act/advising-the-attorney-general>.
40
Although government lawyers in the Department of Justice have been unwilling to give
formal interviews, informal conversations have suggested that the Harper administration is willing to
pursue legislation despite a high degree of identified risk. This impression is supported by Globe and
Mail reporter Kirk Makin, who on the basis of anonymous interviews with senior members of the
Department of Justice, reports that “legislation has been pushed through despite stern internal
warnings that it would likely violate Charter provisions”. Kirk Makin, “Canadian Crime and
American Punishment” The Globe and Mail (Quebec ed.) (November 27, 2009), at F7.
41
James B. Kelly & Matthew A. Hennigar, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and the Minister of Justice: Weak-form Review within a Constitutional Charter of Rights” (2012) 10:1 I-Con 35
[hereinafter “Kelly & Hennigar”].
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the Minister of Justice when performing the reporting function,42 Kelly
and Hennigar argue that the portfolios of the Minister of Justice and
Attorney General should be treated as formally distinct. Whereas the
Minister of Justice would function within government as the parliamentarian who is responsible for advocating legal policy, under their scenario, the separate office of the Attorney General would be responsible for
litigating on behalf of the government and providing legal advice that is
based on assessing the constitutionality of the government’s agenda.
They argue that the problem with the fusion of these offices, even if
one argues for more independence from partisan and governmental
influences, is that the Minister of Justice cannot act independently from
cabinet. Thus, they call for the Attorney General to be accessible to
cabinet deliberations, but not necessarily to be a full voting member of
the cabinet. This change, they argue, would ensure greater independence
from cabinet solidarity, as is the practice in some other Westminsterbased parliamentary systems.43 In the United Kingdom, the reporting on
consistency with rights is not centralized in the office of the Attorney
General but instead is made by individual ministers. However, the
ultimate government authority on these matters is the Attorney General,
who is a member of the ministry but, by convention, is independent of
cabinet. In New Zealand, the Attorney General has responsibility for
legal advice about compatibility and is a member of cabinet but, by
convention, is not bound by cabinet solidarity on questions of the law.44

VI. LACK OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
If lack of transparency is a problem for legal academics who study
how Charter considerations influence political behaviour, it has even
more troubling implications for Parliament. Whether a government
invokes a rights-aversion or a risk-taking strategy, Parliament is generally unaware of the level of risk that legislation could be invalidated or
the government’s assumptions about why it assumes that the risk is worth
42
John Ll. J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.,
1964); John Ll. J. Edwards, Ministerial Responsibility for National Security as it Relates to the
Offices of Prime Minister, Attorney General and Solicitor General of Canada (Study published for
the McDonald Commission of Inquiry) (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1980); Ian Scott,
“Law, Policy, and the Role of the Attorney General: Constance and Change in the 1980s” (1989) 39
U.T.L.J. 109; Kent Roach, “Not Just the Government’s Lawyer: The Attorney General as Defender
of the Rule of Law (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 601.
43
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44
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taking. Parliament has become even more marginalized in terms of its
influence on government than before the Charter was adopted. This is a
result of the increasingly centralized nature of how power is exercised
(which has occurred independent of but overlapping the time frame of
the Charter), which Donald Savoie characterizes as governing at the
centre,45 and also because advice on Charter consistency is centralized in
the Department of Justice and this information is confidential to government and not accessible to Parliament.
James Kelly discusses the institutional imbalance between relevant
information and engagement with questions of Charter consistency that
arises between the Cabinet and Parliament. Kelly argues that this
imbalance contributed to the decline of Parliament as a legislativemaking body because it has undermined political and constitutional
scrutiny of the cabinet’s legislative agenda.46 Notwithstanding rare
occasions where Parliament addressed the Charter implications of
contentious legislative bills (such as the government’s legislative
response to the Seaboyer, Daviault and O’Connor rulings,47 and antiterrorist measures in the wake of anti-terrorist legislation),48 as a general
matter, Parliament is seldom a focus for deliberation about whether bills
are consistent with the Charter or should be amended to redress consistency problems.
This lack of parliamentary Charter engagement occurs despite the
fact that the Canadian Parliament has a committee in each house that
evaluates constitutional and legal dimensions of bills. These are the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
and the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs.
These committees often hear from witnesses who present a range of
opinions on Charter and other relevant issues. Yet committee members
have indicated they lack adequate time and information to make informed judgments about the extent and nature of Charter concerns.49
Moreover, their lack of independent legal advice on the Charter can make
it difficult to know how to assess the significance of committee testimony by individuals or groups who allege a serious Charter breach,
particularly when the Minister of Justice has not reported a compatibility
45
Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian
Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
46
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problem. The absence of any ministerial report on Charter inconsistency
has dissuaded Parliament from participating in judgment about compatibility, either because of the possible mistaken assumption that the
absence of a report should be construed as confirmation that serious
Charter problems do not exist or, more likely, because neither government nor Parliament conceives of Parliament as a significant forum for
debates about Charter consistency. As a consequence, Parliament is
entirely unaware of the nature of the legal advice on Charter consistency
rendered, whether or how often a government ignores or disagrees with
its legal advisors’ evaluations of Charter compatibility, or the likelihood
that legislation could be subject to judicial invalidation if subsequently
litigated. This lack of parliamentary awareness for how legislation
implicates the Charter raises the serious concern that Parliament will
regularly pass legislation without knowing whether the legislation has
significant Charter problems.

VII. REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF LEGISLATIVE RIGHTS
REVIEW IN CANADA
Canada would benefit from revisiting the reasons and benefits of
legislative rights review, and considering reforms to facilitate Parliament’s capacity and knowledge to make reasoned judgments about
whether legislation is justifiable under the Charter.
Skeptics might question this claim to revisit the role of legislative
rights review under the Charter on two accounts. First, they might query
why legislative rights review is even necessary under a constitutional bill
of rights that authorizes strong judicial remedial powers, and second,
they might question whether Parliament has the institutional capacity or
temperament to engage in judgments about rights. It is easier to respond
to this first skeptical query than the latter (but as argued later, four
reforms to current procedures would help revitalize Parliament’s institutional capacity to call on government to defend and explain assumptions
about why legislative initiatives are justified from a Charter perspective).
In responding to skepticism about relevance, the following three reasons
justify revisiting the concept of legislative rights review under the
Charter.
First, parliamentary engagement with how the Charter should guide
or constrain legislation would help reconcile democratic concerns with
respect for rights. Parliamentary scrutiny of the merits of legislative objec-
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tives and their means would better enable Parliament to achieve its
legislative intentions in a constitutionally viable manner, than if Parliament
were compelled to revise legislation within judicially defined parameters
after a negative judicial finding, in what many Charter scholars currently
characterize as the “dialogue” phase of inter-institutional disagreements.50
If government is not pressured to explain its assumptions about whether
and how legislative bills are justified in light of their Charter implications, Parliament could be in danger of unknowingly passing legislation
that is either overly risky in terms of its potential for successful Charter
litigation or, alternatively, overly risk averse and thus less ambitious or
effective than otherwise necessary. Either way, the idea that Parliament is
required to vote on legislation despite being uncertain about the Charter
implications undermines the idea that legislation should be guided by the
normative values reflected in the Charter. Not only would parliamentary Charter scrutiny more likely result in legislation that reflects more
reasoned judgment about whether legislation is justified in light of its
adverse implications for protected rights than current practices that rely
on government checking itself, but Charter scrutiny, or the lack of it,
would also be useful for external assessments by judges when assessing
the justification of legislation.
Second, legislative rights review has the potential to rebalance power
between Parliament and the executive. The popularity of the Charter has
made it difficult for politicians to openly criticize the Charter or argue
that Charter values should be ignored if these constrain a legislative
objective that the government strongly supports. If a process of parliamentary Charter scrutiny were institutionalized, this would help create an
expectation that government should explain assumptions about why bills
are warranted and justified in light of their consistency with the Charter.
This scrutiny would also make it more difficult for government to act as
if it has a political monopoly on Charter judgment, as it currently does by
default because of Parliament’s lack of engagement, and would also
expose the contested nature of government claims of compatibility.
Finally, incorporating legislative rights review would offer more
comprehensive rights protection than relying so heavily on judicial
review and judicial remedies, and thus would address a serious concern
that has long plagued more conventional bills of rights. The concern is
50
Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 75; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) PARLIAMENTARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CHARTER

103

that judicially imposed remedies can only provide partial protection
against rights infringements because the majority of legislation passed
will not be litigated and therefore will not be subject to judicial review.
Thus, if Parliament were to pass rights-offending legislation regularly,
whether by intention or by neglect, only a small portion of these rightsoffending decisions would ever be corrected through judicially imposed
remedies. As Brian Slattery argues in challenging the idea that judicial
review is a sufficient remedy for a lack of political engagement with the
Charter:
Courts have only a limited capacity to assess the correctness of
governmental decisions on crucial aspects of public policy and so
(quite properly in many instances) may feel constrained to defer to the
wisdom of the government on these points. It follows that for a
government to adopt the attitude of “pass now, justify in court later”
would not only be an abdication of its Charter responsibilities, but in
fact would undermine the foundation s of judicial respect for the
decisions of coordinate branches of government.51

VIII. REFORM CONSIDERATIONS TO STRENGTHEN
PARLIAMENTARY CHARTER SCRUTINY
This paper concludes by suggesting four reforms to current practices
that would help facilitate Parliament’s capacity to engage in Charter
scrutiny. Three of these are influenced by the United Kingdom’s implementation of legislative rights review.
The first reform would be to alter the nature of the statutory reporting obligation to include a statement on the compatibility status for all
government bills. The United Kingdom approach requires either a report
on whether bills are compatible with protected rights (which is the
category in which the overwhelming majority of bills fit) or, where this is
not possible, a report that the minister is unable to claim that the bill is
compatible.52
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Broadening the reporting obligation in Canada is not likely to result
in reports of an inability to claim compatibility, for the same reasons the
Minister of Justice is not currently willing to acknowledge that bills are
inconsistent with the Charter. Nevertheless, a statutory requirement to
address the compatibility of all bills would help focus Parliament’s
attention on the fact that Charter compatibility should be a consideration
in parliamentary debate and that political judgment about compatibility is
often contested.53
A second reform Canada should consider is also influenced by the
United Kingdom, where the responsibility for ministerial reports on
compatibility is adapted for a bicameral system, and therefore requires a
report to be made in both houses. This would ensure that Charter concerns do not arise because of amendments proposed after the initial
report was made.
The third consideration is derived from the persuasive arguments by
Kelly and Hennigar to help reduce the risk of partisan influence from
legislative assessments of Charter compatibility, by separating the
responsibility for providing legal advice from political responsibility to
develop the government’s legal policy. Thus, the functions of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice would be formally distinguished, and
Charter assessments and reports to Parliament would be conducted by the
Attorney General, rather than by the Minister of Justice.
Finally, Canada should follow the United Kingdom’s lead by establishing a specialized joint committee to assess questions of rights.54 The
Joint Committee of Human Rights (“JCHR”) in the United Kingdom
has earned a strong reputation for the robust scrutiny it provides. The
Committee, assisted by a highly respected human rights lawyer, examines all bills and focuses particular attention on those that raise questions
of compatibility with protected rights. The committee assesses ministerial claims of compatibility, analyzes the implications of bills for protected rights, writes to departments and ministers with queries and
follows up on responses, conducts hearings to elicit evidence where
concerns arise about whether government claims about the importance or
(b)

make a statement to the effect that although he is unable to make a statement of
compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the
Bill.
(2) The statement must be in writing and be published in such manner as the Minister
making it considers appropriate.
53
This argument was developed by the author in “Interpreting a Bill of Rights, supra, note 1,
at 253-54.
54
Kelly also makes this recommendation in “Legislative Activism”, supra, note 35, at 101-102.

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) PARLIAMENTARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CHARTER

105

nature of the perceived problem warrant the measures proposed by
government, and reports its recommendations and concerns to Parliament
while a bill is still being debated in at least one house of Parliament.55
Policy officials and legal advisors interviewed suggest three ways in
which JCHR reports influence legislation. First, departments and ministers
try to avoid being subject to a critical report and thus where possible will
anticipate JCHR concerns to avoid this prospect. Second, public officials
acknowledge that on occasion the JCHR draws attention to issues that
were overlooked in the pre-introduction evaluation of bills. Third, the
JCHR’s persistent criticism of the lack of reasons or explanations for
ministerial claims of compatibility has increased pressure on departments
to provide more substantive explanations to support the claim about why
a bill is compatible with protected rights.
Research suggests at least one other way of influencing government:
pressure to increase safeguards necessary for ensuring that policies are
implemented in a compatible manner. Disagreements with the JCHR on
compatibility have arisen because departmental compatibility assessments are based on the actual provisions of the legislation, whereas the
JCHR pays more attention to problems that could arise from insufficient
safeguards to ensure policies are interpreted and applied in a rightscompatible manner.56
This idea for a joint parliamentary Charter committee is not an obvious panacea for the current lack of reasoned or robust parliamentary
engagement with the Charter. Canadian parliamentary proceedings are
heavily conditioned by several factors that constrain Parliament’s
influence on government. The most significant constraint is stronger
party discipline that far exceeds what occurs in the United Kingdom. The
smaller size of the Canadian Parliament makes it easier for government
to control its caucus, and backbench members rarely revolt or vote
against a government bill because their desire to remain on good terms
with the leader dissuades them from having a more robust conception of
their role as parliamentarians. A second serious constraint is the concentration of power in the office of party leaders, which far exceeds the
55
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power of party leaders in other Westminster parliamentary systems.
Members can be pressured to support party positions in the lower house
because of unparalleled Canadian powers to oust members from caucus
for failing to support the government, and even to refuse to sign their
nomination papers for future elections.
However, the effort to facilitate a rights-oriented debate in the Canadian House of Commons has one important advantage that the United
Kingdom lacks: the popularity of the Charter is in sharp contrast to high
levels of political and public skepticism about the Human Rights Act in
the United Kingdom. If the question of Charter compatibility became a
more substantial part of assessing the merits of the government’s legislative agenda, this would almost certainly strengthen the capacity of the
House of Commons to place pressure on government to justify and
explain its assumptions about why bills are compatible with protected
rights, increase pressure on government to consider amendments to redress
perceived Charter problems and, where the issue of consistency was
contested, to explain why the government believes the bill is nevertheless
meritorious.

IX. CONCLUSION
Legislative rights review has become a core element in recently
introduced parliamentary bills of rights. Whether as compensation for
constraints on the scope of judicial remedial power or a sincere belief
that a bill of rights is better conceived as encouraging proactive attempts
to avoid rights violations, bills of rights introduced after the adoption of
the Charter have embodied attempts to reduce the likelihood that Parliament passes legislation without awareness of the implications for rights.
Yet this idea is worthwhile, independent of the form a bill of rights takes,
because legislative rights review addresses a fundamental challenge that
all bills of rights incur: will rights protection be undermined by Parliament’s failure to engage in judgment about how rights appropriately
guide or constrain legislative decisions? Thus, whether a bill of rights
authorizes strong-form or weak-form judicial review, a bill of rights can
only provide minimal or partial protection if courts are the sole institutional venue for assessing the merits or legitimacy of legislation from a
rights perspective.
Canada would benefit from placing more emphasis on Parliament’s
responsibility to scrutinize legislation in terms of justification and
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consistency with the Charter. However, the possibility of integrating
Charter consideration more fully into legislative deliberations is not a
realistic option as long as Parliament defers to government for judgment
about compatibility and continues to absolve government of responsibility to explain its reasons for assuming that bills are consistent with or
justified under the Charter.
This paper has identified several reforms that would help improve
Parliament’s capacity to assess bills in terms of their implications for the
Charter. In the absence of reforms to require government to explain and
account for bills that implicate rights adversely, Parliament remains in
the untenable position of passing legislation for which it does not fully
understand the Charter implications. The fact that only a small fraction of
the legislation passed will ever be subject to Charter litigation suggests
that current Canadian practices can provide only limited assurances that
Charter values appropriately guide and constrain Canadian laws.
Although the focus of this paper is on Parliament’s role under the
Charter, it is interesting to speculate whether parliamentary deliberations
about Charter justification would (or should) influence judicial rulings. A
decision about whether or how courts should be guided by the quality of
parliamentary deliberations is ultimately a judicial prerogative. Yet, it
seems fair to suggest that reasoned parliamentary deliberation is more
likely to produce reasonable legislation than when such deliberation is
absent, and that the reasonableness of the legislation will also be more
apparent. It also seems appropriate to suggest that where contentious
legislation is passed that raises serious questions of Charter consistency,
and parliamentary deliberations seem opaque or non-responsive to
Charter concerns, judges might reasonably ask themselves why judicial
deference is warranted, particularly when judges have a reasonable
basis to be apprehensive that a regular or predictable pattern of judicial
deference will undermine the political incentives for government to take
Charter considerations seriously.

